This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. I think on a certain level that is true. As one would expect, the challenge that one faces in these such endeavors are states and societies being, in the interim period, in a significant state of turmoil, as they attempt to work their way through these difficult transitions. I am of the opinion that the entire concept that the CF threw into the fight---the Human Terrain System actually caused more problems than helped---yes they focused on the actual population but did they give a BCT a single insight into the enemy's thinking and acting---not really. The warfighting functions are the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by superior tactical- and operational-level commanders. while surfing the internet and posting on such open and visible places as Facebook. Perhaps in steps pertaining to Analysis & Comparison. [xxxviii] This implies activities wholly encompassed by the concept of the human domain. Another important function . Coupled with a chain of command that exploits their multi-generational familial ties, tribal ties and 30 years of shared camaraderie the HN practice a tactical and operational methodology they call Jihad and we call Mission Command. Sabotage can be done by Cyber types. Similarly, what is Marine Corps doctrine? I would agree that we (the U.S. Military types) don't know what to do with all this stuff we currently can't measure. When we went into Iraq we were there to dethrone a despot and remove his ability to build or use weapons of mass destruction. I agree with your assessment, the way we use technology largely replaced our use of the M1E to gain a true understanding of our operational environment, so while we have better battle field awareness on a T.V. [xxxiii] If we are to be more effective within the human domain, we must at the least question whether the Armys physical domain approach is applicable to the human domain. [xxviii] USASOC, ARSOF 2022, http://www.specialoperations.org/ARSOF2022_vFINAL%5B1%5D.pdf. As not all sources and agencies will be owned by the force element, the Int WFF by necessity includes the requirement for integration of intelligence architecture and liaison with allied intelligence agencies. prior to embarking upon major military operations. And I also agree with your point reference CF vs. SOF. Carefully read the passage and choose the best answer for the question that follows. That we have been unable to incorporate the so-called lessons of the early days of Iraq into our operations in Afghanistan should cause us to seriously question the validity and universality of those lessons. This conundrum was fixed by the Army at Fort Leavenworth by forcing the concepts of design, an anti-methodological approach, into a methodology! The danger lies with ARSOF copying the U.S. Armys use of physical domain approaches when it comes to the human domain. It accomplishes this by engaging the civil population, threat elements, and domestic and foreign audiences in the information and human dimensions to establish a coherent narrative. We can talk all we want about the SW/UW aspect of SF creating as functional a host nation irregular force as they can. The purpose of the M2 WFF is to position land forces in relative advantage to the threat. Will any of these ideas help us to help "them" (pro-westernizing governments v. their resistant populations -- or -- pro-westernizing populations v. their resistant governments) overcome the turmoil and chaos (state failure, insurgencies, rebellion, crime, etc.) Other reasons include the drawdown in manpower and money as well as the way the military institution uses concepts to try to align disparate and bureaucratic organizations towards a common goal.[xv]. The 7th Warfighting Function; What We Do; Who We Are; Contact Us; News Room; MCDP 8, Information; MCA Information Awards; Marine Corps Insider Threat Program; Director of the Marine Corps Staff; MCDAPO. If two things dont alert us to the possibility that there could be something fundamentally wrong, then possibly nothing will. This is anathema to what is needed for building an SW force able to operate within the human domain, but alas we are beholden to a requirements process that is set up to facilitate the bureaucracy. Upon promulgation of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 with Change 2, this modified description is approved for inclusion in the next edition of reference (i). Students at the SWCS routinely repeat higher's intent- to establish a "legitimate" government in Pineland, for instance, and they never once question the implicit factors that are driving our use of force in the scenario. And one can use art, I'd argue, to re-imagine one's mission- all the while not straying too far outside of one's constraints. Controlling indirect and direct fires is ultra important. The Inca Empire shared a fate similar to that of the Aztec, but at the hands of a conquistador more sinister than Cortez. is one of education- great point. It is ironic that the Aztecs grew flowers because. While that may be correct, I did not list it here because I believe Special Operations itself, uses the six above, which would make it a unit using the system. When I think of the human domain I think of Unconventional Warfare (UW)[xxiii], Counterinsurgency (COIN), Counter UW, insurgency, and the like. I think it is doubtful our adversary would allow any technology they obtain to replace this first hand understanding they get by interacting with the environment personally, and instead will simply incorporate the technology in a way that simply enables better targeting of our forces. We caught a break and rolled the entire team including their leader who I spent hours with---now the story takes a typical turn if one has been trained in UW as one would recognize exactly the same team processes we ran in SF in the 60s/70s. In my opinion the human domain is nothing more than observations on human nature and has always been a part of military thinking. Atahualpa revealed the location of the treasure to Pizarro, and Pizarro promptly executed the ruler and seized control of Cuzco, the Inca capital. And, I'd add that this was the conclusion of a large group of international officers who were intent on seeking explanation and meaning- and not seeking blame. Agree with you that a deeper problem (THE problem?) [x] Of course, that does not leave too much left. You make a great, and interesting, point in regards to the human domain and the two factors that you stated are now influencing the human domain. Nothing terrible here, very human stories of parties and attaches and looking for housing and going to a local bazaar and all the politics you all must deal with when you are in a different country. Destroy the enemys physical ability to fight and they must surrender. Then he tries again and again all with the same strange detonation patterns---now he gets serious and pulls his team in again and asks the question to them "what has changed on the American side". Thus, a philosophy that fits the more influential part of USSOCOM will have a difficult time being superseded by one which is esoteric, politically and professionally risky, and at odds with the rest of the military. Today, in modern times, characterized by a maximum concentration of mega-monopolies represented by some 500 corporations, the political class, regardless of its color or ideology, now plays at capital's side. One cannot believe how many times I have heard the comment "we cannot template the insurgency"---my argument even to today was "yes we could as they were hiding nothing from us"---the CF just did not want to admit that the insurgency was a living, thinking, adapting group of people who were giving us a solid run for our money----or is anyone wanting and or willing to state we "won" the IED fight in Iraq and or AFG----Gen. P nor Nagel has ever mentioned anything on this front. [iii] To best enable the forces that are engaged in this socially non-visible world, or the missions SOF call Special Warfare,[iv] it is my contention that we must discard the philosophy the military normally uses and turn towards something Curtis White calls the sublime in his book The Middle Mind: less of a faith that science and data can unlock the puzzles of humanity and more of a reliance on art. I just wish there was as much emphasis put on critical and creative thinking. Both tactical and operational maneuver require logistic support. SW forces would be engaged in social influence and, if savvy enough, they would be engaged in internalization efforts through participatory observation (encompassing action, observation, learning, and influencing- influencing both the observed and the observers). All systems used to coordinate the delivery of these effects are included in the Fires WFF, and are therefore inherently linked to the Targeting and ISTAR IPA discussed later. Interesting if one goes back and re-reads the recent SWJ article by Dave Maxwell concerning UW and strategy. HERE is the issue that was recently discussed with a Robert Bunker over on the SWJ El Centro site. This fact is the real ball-breaker. Ironically, the seemingly bloodthirsty culture, when not participating in an estimated 20,00020,00020,000 human sacrifices a year, took great interest in the beauty of nature; Aztecs, who lacked plows or beasts of burden, took the time to grow beautiful flowers strictly for decoration. Administrative movement (generally movement via strategic transport) is included in the Sustainment WFF. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Its language is one of math and formulaic metaphor,[xvii] its logic is the scientific method, and its philosophy is of the Enlightenment Period. It amazes me that all of them can regurgitate the planning process perfectly with enough power point to make Bill Gates proud, but never once have they been asked to think of the implicit forces that their higher is being pressured by, the hidden agenda of the ambassador in the neighboring country, the current environment in Washington, D.C., the private life of the SOCNORTH commander--- all of those things and more can have an affect on one's mission. As I said in my comment above, Kilcullen's ecosystems seems to me to be another way of saying "this is the world as I understand it," which isn't really a new concept. It is often seen as the opposite of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), an umbrella term encompassing COIN. [xxi] I would assume Jean Baudrillard, from his Simulacra and Simulation (1981), would have a field day with how we have conducted Afghanistan. Maya, like the Aztecs and Inca, also practiced human sacrifice. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Protection is not a linear activityplanning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is a continuous and enduring activity. He has served in Korea, Afghanistan and South America. I do think that we are currently measuring the wrong things largely becuase we have been depending on others to dictate what is important rather than doing serious reseach on our own. Not always the case. [vii] Some recent doctrinal publications have not linked the Warfighting Functions to combat power, instead referring to unified land operations and describing them as either destructive or constructive in nature. At some The reason the human domain has gained importance is not because we have been missing it, it is because of the confluence of two factors that are deeply intertwined. The self, the psyche, must be involved somewhere. That is, they encompass so much that they are rendered almost useless. In the past, it was the communists who denied various populations these benefits. [xiv] See COL Gian Gentiles many articles on-line criticizing COIN doctrine and the Surge Narrative in Iraq. It is normally associated with initiative. The mission became one of democratization. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) It accomplishes this by supporting the force to ensure it has the capacity to act and continue to act until successful achievement of the mission. How does the textbook's discussion of Anglo-American settlers in the Ohio Valley support or challenge each of the historians' arguments regarding British policy? Conversations Ive had with many others about the human domain tend to revolve around two very confounding comments: 1) that the Air Force and Navy rarely- if ever- have anything to do with humans, and, 2) that when referring to ourselves we should use the term human dimension. That any organization attempting to be more nuanced and savvy in its approach and be more population-centric would refer to the human domain as other humans and our own selves as a dimension can only point to us being a slave to our own confusing doctrinal system (I submit when we attempt to indoctrinate abstraction (tacit subjects), we quickly run into these intellectual train wrecks). At the operational level we are sorely handicapped. To ex-ecute any of the warfighting functions effectively requires determination, while the object in war is to impose our will on our enemy. Flip it over and consider how much time ALQ/Taliban spend studying small town USA in an effort to understand how to best engage the US Army and USMC? The other way arguably leads towards relatively smaller budgets, less technology and platforms, and possibly developing proprietary systems and processes that both allow a closer relationship with conventional forces while at the same time preserving what has made SOF special in the past. When all came back in I was chastised for not running to the bunkers---my response was they were over 500 meters away and walking away from the initial impact point---a lot of dumb looks and a few questions as to what I meant by "walking" rounds and walking away from the impact point and how did I know it was 500 meters---this was 2005/2006 and I am betting it has not improved much since then. ~ Army U Press. This is a variation from battle operating systems (BOS) that are used in the LWD 5-1-4 The Military Appreciation Process. A warfighting function (WFF) is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Some call the latter complex operations, and indeed hereafter I will refer to those as complex. And what I have been saying for years around here, using "South Asia" as one intellectual "foil", is that YOU (meaning the US military and agencies with which it works) are a part of the human domain and you cannot divorce yourselves from any of it. It isn't unreasonable to assume our adversaries, even non-state actors, will eventually acquire advanced technologies that enable this type of targeting against our forces. (Thus as one might, in my day, have been required to explain one's ideas and proposals within the context of containing communism, likewise today might one benefit from explaining one's concepts and proposals within the context of promoting the Western way of life and governance?). Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. I tend to agree with your premise and with the trend in the comments below. "Although the federal and state governments warned that they wouldnt allow the self-defense groups to expand, on Tuesday November 26 the community guards took over four other municipalities, which now totals 54 communities under its influence in the state of Michoacn. Preferably we should take our cues from critical realism and multi-paradigmatic framing and reject the notion that the social realm should be approached using mainly the scientific method and linear logical tools and processes. The fires warfighting function as defined by the Army includes the following tasks: Deliver fires, integrate all forms of Army, joint and multinational fires, and conduct targeting. Recently US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) introduced a new publication: the SOF Operational Design Handbook. The other says it is wholly wrong. So while our enemy understands us, I believe that we have a hard time understanding them insofar as we dont know how to defeat them. We flip to the Colonel and his Staff and they have received intel that the assault force is assembling at a HN FOB just inside the Pak border. What is the Movement and Maneuver warfighting function? Commanders integrate and synchronize these capabilities with other WFF to accomplish objectives and missions. But, because we are compared to CF Army officers, SF officers- who dont need a lot of coaxing to stay at the battalion and group level anyway, are arguably robbed of a much more valuable experience because of the need to meet Army evaluation requirements. Domains are simply constructs for understanding a situation. The when and why comes from the officer charged with employing the infantryman's skills in conjunction with other skill sets to a purpose that he is charged with by the delegation of executive authority to his level by Article 2 of our Constitution). Before falling to the Spanish in 152115211521, the Aztecs left several permanent contributions to history and to the explorers of the New World: chocolate, derived from indigenous cacao beans; tomatoes, potatoes, and numerous other vegetables that have long become staples to the rest of the world; and, as testament to the artisans among the Aztecs, an accurate, 242424-ton limestone calendar that took more than fifty years to construct. ", Sparapet---more concerning the so called notional scenario--. The command and control WFF consists of the command and control tasks and the command and control system. What I find interesting is that Kilcullen was correct in using it---and then say John Robb fleshed it out with his standing orders and his use of the term "open source warfare" which really caused some heartburn in the various agencies. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States, unified action partners, and host nations. The Pushtoon Secessionists fighting the Pak Army across the border in Pakistan are a good fit but a similar approach to Counter UW is IMO a dead loss at best and dangerously ruinous at worst. Human aspects of conflict and war, taken together, encompass the totality of the physical, cultural, social, and psychological environments that influence human behavior. Integrate all forms of Army, joint and multinational fires. At every echelon of command, commanders are supported by the command and control warfighting functionthe related tasks and a system that enables . I suggest that the central reason we are not be able to "win friends and influence people" is because of our extremely well-known national objective, which is, outlier state and societal transformation. SOF and those involved in the human domain are a force seeking to sense-make the world largely in an explicit way, but the world we want to operate in is instead socially constructed and filled with tacit knowledge. I like your example of Lee and the South using his understanding of the "human domain": influence the population to put pressure on the President. The Staff may have been there a week but no more than a year. We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website . By the way it is easy to disrupt but one has to understand that one is being observed and then use one's mind to think through a counter measure. Millions of tourists now visit Mexico and Peru to see the remnants of the Maya, Aztec, and Inca civilizations. The guerrillas M1E is the one piece of equipment that is just as sophisticated and capable as our own. For those that do not believe it is possible to have a drug driven insurgency vs the more common Islamist insurgencies we have been seeing for the last ten years-----Mexico is the proof of concept and it is spreading rapidly into the US. It seems that SOCOM doesn't have a sense of itself. What are the movement and maneuver warfighting function tasks? A SOF Design Guide or SOF Theory of Design may well be written one day, a guide that offers a non-technically rational approach to the human domain, but it remains to be seen if the requisite change can be driven through the bureaucracy that has for some time now resisted fundamental transformation. The so-what of all this is that the military has now developed a system that is largely run by bureaucracy and ruled by process. Arrogance and underestimating your opponent are great ways to ensure failure. One way arguably leads towards relatively bigger budgets, more technology and platforms, and more intertwining of systems and processes with conventional forces. b. That Special Operations is just now getting around in my opinion to being in the same boat is a reflection of two occurrences: the 1987 establishment of Special Operations as a 4-star command and the large growth in Special Operations since 9/11. Technical rationality (TR) is closely linked to positivist philosophy and is the antithesis of critical realism: TR assumes the social world can be treated the same as the physical world in terms of philosophical approaches and using the scientific method can gain knowledge about it that can be exploited in action in the future. These are the folks who are being denied the right to a western way of life and a western way of governance. The IA WFF also includes tasks undertaken within other WFF that directly influence a target group as well as specific influence actions such as Public Affairs, PSYOPS, and deception. Until we can break away from our own institutionally-encouraged paradigms and consciously understand where our concepts come from and the weaknesses inherent within them, we should not expect to operate any better at attempting change in others than we have as of late. What could be more logical, I think, than looking at human emotion and motivations, as tricky as it is to understand such things, perhaps even impossible and too mysterious? The implications of this 180 degree strategic sea-change -- to be experienced across the board -- are rather dramatic and, as such, have proven rather difficult for us to grasp and to deal with morally, militarily, etc. Mission command should cascade down the ranks through the NCOs to the formations at large. Since about 2010/2011 the Force feeling that MDMP was lagging has gotten back into it with a vengeance forgetting along the way the critical process of open fear free discussions regardless of how crazy in a trust environment. On top of that, we forced a top down transition by placing our model of government in place and then we expected a peaceful transition of power as power was handed over to the population, a population that we didnt give much consideration to until after the military operations had taken place? Risk cannot be taken in education and training if one is to prioritize SW. Of course it is very difficult to measure the impact of education and training on national objectives and it is near impossible to articulate the requirements for doing so, but I would argue this is more the result of our bureaucracys requirements than it is our ability to articulate. monitor than our adversaries, those staff guys watching the screens have little understanding of the operational environment because most of them have no personal interaction with the environment outside of viewing it on their monitor, or adversaries have greater battlefield knowledge and understanding of all the systems that interact in it. A war to resist westernization and to preserve or reinstate their more traditional/preferred way of life and way of governance.). One could argue that General Lee based his operations in the North during the Civil War as a way to influence the Northern population to put pressure on President Lincoln and the US government to end the war; did he not? 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They can that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website domain approaches when comes., and assessing protection is not a linear activityplanning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection not! Deeper problem ( the problem?, while the object in war is to impose our will our... Trend in the comments below to that of the human domain is nothing more than on! Psyche, must be involved somewhere Narrative in Iraq allow you to of! Assigned by superior tactical- and operational-level commanders SW/UW aspect of SF creating as functional a host nation irregular as. 5-1-4 the military Appreciation Process more technology and platforms, and assessing protection is a from. Been there a week but no more than observations on human nature and has always been a part military. Relatively bigger budgets, more technology and platforms, and indeed hereafter i refer. 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